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Canning the Spam and Cutting the Cookies: Consumer Privacy On-Line and EU 
Regulation
Lilian Edwards1
This chapter deals with the new European and UK laws relating to the control of “spam” and 
“cookies”. Spam is best defined as unsolicited junk email (though see below), while cookies 
(or “web beacons”) are small text files placed on the hard disc of a computer user, usually 
without the consent or knowledge of that user, and used extensively on e-commerce sites to 
store data records about that user’s transactions for purposes of profiling and marketing2.  To 
understand the current regulation of spam and cookies and how European law has altered the 
shape of this area, we need now to extend our reach beyond the principal focus thus far in this 
volume on the Electronic Commerce Directive (ECD), to look at subsequent European laws.  
The provisions found in Arts 6 and 7 of the ECD relating to unsolicited (and solicited) 
commercial communications are only one piece, and at that now of somewhat limited 
significance, in a much larger jigsaw of regulation. 
Spam and cookies, as we shall see below, raise important questions about privacy invasion 
and consumer protection.  Spam in particular however creates more purely economic 
problems in the domain of e-commerce and the global Internet, of significance to the public 
interest as a whole, not just to consumers.  Thus global spam regulation, of late, has begun 
looking at ways to preserve the Internet as a whole from collapsing under the deluge of spam, 
rather than merely attempting to protect individual privacy and consumer rights3. In Europe 
however, regulation in this area has to date, and is indeed still, been embedded in the 
traditional sectors of data protection and consumer law. It has been a piecemeal affair, taking 
bites from the general law of privacy and data protection, moving through a guest appearance 
in the E-Commerce Directive and taking star billing in the controversial passage of the 
                                                          
1 Co-Director, AHRB Centre for Intellectual Property and Technology Law, Edinburgh University,  Parts of this chapter 
appeared in a much earlier form in Edwards L. “Canning the Spam: Is there a Case for Legal Control of Junk Electronic 
Mail?” in Edwards L. and Waelde C. eds. Law and the Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce (2000, Hart 
Publishing). I am indebted to all at the Centre for Law and Technology at the University of California at Berkeley, where 
research for this chapter was carried out.
2 See further http://www.allaboutcookies.org .
3 A good example of this is the US Can-Spam Act, which combines traditional rules protecting the privacy of recipients of 
spam with rules aimed at merely reducing the amount of spam in the world, eg,  forbidding the use of third party computers  
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Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 2002 (PECD)4, which is the first EC 
Directive where the question of how to regulate cookies is directly addressed.  We will deal 
below with spam and cookies in turn, considering also, given the global nature of these 
problems, what solutions to these problems have been found in the United States, from which 
most worldwide spam emanates. 
Spam
Few Internet users will not at some point have received an email message of the following 
kind:
Subject:  you forgot the attachment
From:  “ExtremePriceCuts.net” <extremepricecuts@extremepricecuts.net>
Reply-to:  no-one@microsoft.com
_____________________________________________________________
From nothing to rich in 90 hours!! I cracked the Code!  I made over $94,000!!!!!
You May Be Closer (Maybe Hours Away)
To Financial Freedom
If YOU Needed $24,000 In 24 Hours
And your life depended on it…
How Would YOU Do It?
http://www.esioffers.com/track_link.html?link=3664
Such unsolicited or “junk” e-mails are colloquially known as spam5.  They are usually sent out 
to thousands if not millions of electronic mailboxes simultaneously, most often for dubious 
commercial purposes, though some are also sent by private individuals for non-commercial 
purposes, for example to spread racist or homophobic hate speech or for political or religious 
campaigning purposes.  Spam can often be casually spotted by its use of multiple exclamation 
marks and capital letters (the Internet equivalent of shouting), or by enticing subject lines such 
as “get rich quick” or “hot sex here” (although recent iterations of spam tend most often to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
as “zombie drones” to send out spam. See further infra.
4 Directive 2002/58/EC.
5 The name “spam” is, as a matter of Internet urban myth, supposed to derive from a well known Monty Python TV 
comedy sketch involving the chanting of “spam, spam, spam” over and over again.  Spam is of course, originally a trade 
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disguise its true nature in the subject line in a bid to up the “click-through” rate, ie, to induce 
the reader to open it).  Although most often found in the context of email, and Usenet 
newgroups, websites (such as the very popular web-log or “blog” sites6) can also be spammed, 
and for this reason LINX, the London Internet Exchange, and may other leading spam-
blocking sites7, have suggested the best description would be “unsolicited bulk material” or 
UBM.  This type of nomenclature also places the emphasis on the bulk in which the spam is 
sent, not its contents, fraudulent or otherwise, which as we shall see below, is a crucial point 
for would-be regulators of spam to note.  Beyond the sheer question of bulk, it is not easy for 
an automated process to determine which are “genuine” marketing messages and which are 
what is commonly regarded as “spam” - for example, to distinguish between 10,000 emails 
promoting a Nigerian bank fraud scheme and 10,000 emails encouraging alumni of a major 
university to make tax-deductible gifts to that university.  The presenting features of the 
content of spam are that they tend to advertise goods or services the recipient has not actively 
sought (typical examples being pornography, get rich quick schemes, pyramid selling 
schemes, “phishing” emails8, dating agencies or software with which to become a spammer 
yourself); they are often misleading or outright fraudulent; and they are very often offensive, 
obscene, disgusting or illegal in content.  Crucially, spam arrives without the consent of the 
recipient - hence “unsolicited”.  The leading spam country of origin is overwhelmingly the US 
currently, though it is hotly pursued by Far Eastern countries such as China and South Korea 
as spam havens9.  Significantly, in late 2004 only two EC countries were in the top 10 
spamming countries (Italy and the UK at 9 and 10 respectively) and by February 2005 even 
they had fallen out of the ranks.  It is a major problem for law enforcement, further discussed 
below, that the majority of spam that circulates in EC countries (estimated at 90% or more) 
comes from outside Europe.
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
marked term for a form of canned luncheon meat.
6 The Mel Gibson directed film “The Passion” (released February, 2004) is noteworthy as the first Hollywood film to be 
promoted by an extensive spam campaign on weblog websites such as Live Journal.  It is though the main aim of that 
campaign was not to spread the word (sic) but to up the Google page rankings of “The Passion” as viewings of blog pages 
contribute significantly to how these are worked out.
7 Spamhaus, the UK based private spam filtering organization, which claims to serve up to 200 million Internet users, note 
that: “The word Spam means “Unsolicited Bulk Mail”.  Unsolicited means that the recipient has not granted verifiable 
permission for the message to be sent.  Bulk means that the message is sent as part of a larger collection of messages, all 
having substantively identical content.  But ask a spammer and he’ll claim it’s something else…  The content of span is and 
always has been irrelevant.  If it’s sent unsolicited and in bulk, it is spam plain and simple.”  See http://www.spamhaus.org/
8 “Phishing” entices the recipient to go to a fake site imitating a known banking or financial site and to there enter a 
password or other details.  The aim of the scam is to give the fraudsters access to the recipient’s details so that fraud can 
then be committed at the authentic site.  Recent UK “phishing” scams have afflicted customers inter alia of Lloyds Bank, 
the Royal Bank of Scotland and PayPal.
9 The top ten spam origin countries as of February 2005  were USA, China,South Korea, Russia, Brazil, Canada, Taiwan, 
Japan, Argentina and Hong Kong.  Earlier montbs have included EU countries such as UK and Italy at the lower end of this 
chart. See Spamhaus, supra n 7.
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Prior to 2000 or so, there was very little legal debate on how spam could, or should, be 
controlled in Europe.  By contrast argument raged among “techies” as to the best 
technological methods for controlling spam.  When spam was still little more than a joke and 
a minor annoyance to consumers (and lawyers) in Europe, it was already becoming a major 
concern to network managers and system operators.  In the US, always ahead in Internet 
litigation, running battles commenced in the courts between spammers and those who longed 
to stamp out the practice - notably Internet Service Providers (ISPs) - in the mid to late 1990s, 
and a flood of individual state statutes subsequently attempted to grapple with the problem in 
various ways10.  More recently, a Federal statute has, after many prior attempts, finally passed 
which prescribes a uniform approach to spam regulation for the entirety of the USA – the 
CAN-SPAM Act of 200311.  UK and European interest, meanwhile, has increased in direct 
proportion to the increasing amount of email that is spam – spam in Europe has grown from 
only 7% of global email traffic in April 2001 to at least 50% of EU email traffic at January 
200412, while some extents put the proportion of spam in email as high as three-quarters of the 
total in the run up to Christmas 2003.  In the US, estimates vary but go as high as over 80% of 
all email traffic probably being designated as spam. At these levels, spam is not just an 
annoyance to users and service providers, but is on the way to making the entire Internet 
effectively unusable for those without highly effective filters in place.  Since spam is also now 
frequently used as a delivery device for viruses, worms and distributed denial of service 
(DDOS) attacks it is not uncommon to view every spam email nowadays as a “ticking bomb”. 
More broadly, the European Union has clearly espoused the view that development of 
consumer confidence in the Internet as a commercial medium is dependent on consumer and 
retailer trust, and both spam and cookies are key problems which persistently remind users 
that the Internet has not yet attained the status of a safe and known environment.  Accordingly, 
spam, once a matter of joke and urban legend, and cookies, of which most Internet users have 
still probably never heard, have become some of the most pressing issues for modern e-
                                                          
10 See David Sorkin’s useful inventory of spam laws at http://www.spamlaws.com/ .
11 This is the informal title of the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003.  The 
Act passed on November 25 2003 and came into force on January 1 2004.
12 See EU press release, IP/o4/103, 27 January 2004.  A variety of industry based pressure group in Europe are dedicated 
to the fight against spam, including E-CAUCE, the European Coalition against Unsolicited Commercial Email, web site at 
http://www.euro.cauce.org/en/index.html .  A useful US and Europe based anti-spam site is Junkbusters at 
http://www.junkbusters.com .  Spamhaus, see n 7 above, are a useful source of technical information and statistics: the 
European Commission also provides up to date information at its www.europa.eu.int pages under Information Society 
head.
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commerce legislation to grapple with all over the globe13.  
Finally it is important to note that legislation in this area is an ongoing process as new types of 
privacy-invading technologies are invented.  Cookies are by no means the end of the story: the 
PECD also attempts to grapple with the privacy implications of collection of traffic and 
locational data, which are increasingly likely to be used as means of targeting novel “value 
added” commercial services at consumers.  Most recently, the RFID - Radio Frequency 
Identity - chip, which reports back its whereabouts like a small microphone bug to nearby 
electronic readers, has made the leap from laboratory to shop floor and is currently stirring 
controversy as major High Street retailers and large distributors and manufacturers start to use 
it to improve efficiency and reduce costs, but at untried risks to privacy.  Despite the often–
made claims of the EC that it attempts to draft e-Directives in a technology-neutral fashion, it 
is quite probable that even fairly new legislation such as the PECD and the UK implementing 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (“the UK PECD 
Regulations”)14, are already out of date15. Do we need new legislation every time a new 
privacy invasive technology is invented and if so is there any hope that the law will not always 
lag futilely behind the potential harm created by the new privacy-invading technology (PIT)? 
One answer may be to use technology or “code”, not law, to effectively restrain technologies 
harmful effects; and in the final section of this chapter we will consider if  legal regulation in 
this domain is not increasingly an irrelevance and even a distraction from the real solutions 
which may lie in the domains of technology and economics.
Why is spam a problem, and whose problem is it?
As noted above, the historic response to spam before the turn of the century was to regard it as 
a nuisance, and perhaps to take self help measures such as “flaming” (sending abusive emails 
to the spammers) - but not to see it as a fit subject for legal or extra-legal regulation.  However 
a number of factors have conspired to make spam, as noted above, a phenomenon to take very 
seriously indeed.
“Living persons” as victims of spam: offence, annoyance and invasion of privacy
                                                          
13 See n 9 supra and further below.
14 SI 2003/ 2426.  The Regulations finally came into force on 11 December 2003 following an extensive consultation 
exercise by the DTI.
15 See for similar concerns in the field of e-money regulation, Guadamuz  A. and Usher J in Chapter X of this volume.
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Most obviously, much spam is annoying, objectionable, distasteful, and in some cases, deeply 
offensive, to its recipients.  Furthermore, traditional direct marketing was usually only 
directed at solvent adults, while spammers will indiscriminately spam children and other 
vulnerable groups so long as they have an email address16.  Spam also now appears in so 
many media that it is omnipresent both at home and at work.  Spam that came as email was 
bad enough, but in the brave new world of the twenty-first century, unsolicited marketing also 
arrives as  texts to mobile phones, spontaneous downloads to desktops, executable 
attachments alongside email spam which unknowingly plant viruses and spyware, and perhaps 
worst of all, “pop-ups”, windowed advertisement exploiting bugs in Windows soft ware, 
which obscure the user’s desktop, arrive incessantly to some unlucky users, are difficult to 
close, endlessly repetitive, and sufficient to incite “spam rage”17 in the meekest of users18.  
From a traditional European legal perspective, therefore, spam’s worst offence is to be an 
invasion of the privacy of the individual whether the mail box is situated at home or work.  
Spam has been described as combining the worst aspects of junk mail, unwanted telephone 
solicitation (“cold calling”) and junk faxes19.  Looked at this way, spam is not a dissimilar 
problem to traditional, non electronic direct marketing, although it is important to note that the 
costs of marketing by spam are shifted almost wholly from the spammer, to the recipient who 
pays his ISP for Internet bandwidth and access.  For the spammer, each spam costs less than 
0.025 cents to send - for the recipient, the costs will generally be far higher, both in terms of 
time, money and personal irritation.  Given the traditional European view that spam, like 
ordinary junk mail, was primarily an annoyance to living persons in their private sphere, it 
was natural that the main legal response in Europe was to cite the protection offered by data 
protection (DP) law, even though those rules not only pre-dated the deluge of spam, but also 
                                                          
16 Dallman and Dowling noted in 1998: “The British Government is shortly due for a nasty shock due to their policy of 
connecting all schools to the Internet.  Imagine the reaction when the tabloid press discovers that school children are being 
sent advertisements for pornography via the email accounts that the government has provided.”  Towards Useable Email, p 
2 at http://ww.davors.org/legal/dmaspam.html.  Oddly there have been no such scandals, though most schools in the UK 
now have draconian filtering and firewall systems in place which may have forestalled such.
17 “Spam rage” was plead in defence in the case of a Silicon Valley computer programmer, who was arrested for 
threatening to torture and kill employees of the company he blamed for bombarding his computer with Web ads which 
offered to enlarge his penis: see report of November 21 2003, at 
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,61339,00.html.
18 Or as the judge at first instance in the US District Court case of U-Haul International v WhenU.com Inc, CA 02-1469, 
plaintively puts it: “Computer users, like this trial judge, may wonder what we have done to warrant the punishment of 
seizure of our computer screens by pop-up advertisements that require us to click, click and click again in order to return to 
our Internet work.”
19 See Byrne “Squeezing Spam Off the Net: Federal Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Email” (1998) 2 W. Va.JL and 
Tech 4.
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were largely formulated before the arrival of the modern Internet20.  DP law does indeed in 
general forbid the processing, which includes collection and transmission, of “personal data” 
which identifiably describes a “living individual21” without the consent of that individual.  It 
also bans in particular the use of personal data by direct marketers if the individual whom 
those details describe refuses to allow them use22.  Such protection however is not available to 
corporations who are not living persons and thus incapable of being regarded as data 
subjects23.  Since small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and sole traders suffer just as 
much or more economically from spam as individuals this is a major flaw in a DP-centric 
approach to spam regulation. The UK PECD regulations, as we shall see, do offer some 
limited extension of protection to juristic persons. In the US the situation is wholly different; 
not only is there of course no omnibus DP regime, but it has also long been accepted, albeit 
with some reluctance, that direct marketing is a form of speech and as such protected by First 
Amendments rights, although the protection given is much less than that which would be 
accorded non-commercial speech24.
And of course, for those few individual who do (mysteriously) take up the offers promoted by 
spammers, spam is not just a matter of disgust and invasion of privacy, but a serious cause of 
financial loss and personal dismay as a result of fraud.  However such loss is usually covered 
by one or more existing laws relating to fraud in general, to mail fraud, credit card fraud or to 
abuse of phone lines or telecommunications25. Accordingly the EC approach has been that 
particular regulation of spam based on loss to living individuals should mainly be conceived 
as relating to dignitary (privacy) rather than economic loss.
                                                          
20 See EC Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC), implanted in the UK by the Data Protection Act 1998, and EC Telecoms 
Data Protection Directive, 97/66/EC, implemented in the UK by Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) 
(Direct Marketing) Regulations SI 1998 No 3170 (relating to telephone solicitation).
21 See Data Protection Act 1998, s 1(1) and discussion in Edwards, supra n 1.
22 See Data Protection Act 1998, s 11.
23 This point is taken up interestingly by Bygrave L. Data Protection Law : Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits
(Kluwer, 2002)
24 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v Virginia Citizen’s Consumer Council Inc 425 US 748.  See most recently the failure 
of telemarketers to have the “Do Not Call” register set up by the Federal Trade Commission declared a breach of the First 
Amendment: see decision of the 10th US Circuit Court of Appeals in Mainstream Marketing Service v FTC at 
http://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/03-1429.pdf.
25 The Communications Act 2003, s 127 (1) makes it an offence to send by means of a public telecommunications network 
a message that is “grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character”. Section 127(2) further provides that 
a person is guilty of a crime if he persistently uses a public  electronic communications network to send messages he 
“knows to be false” – but, only if this is done “for the purposes of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety”. 
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Economic impacts of spam: the Internet, the ISPs and employers
If offence and annoyance to individuals, plus some significant economic loss to a few gullible 
souls26 was all the damage spam caused, there would be good reason to leave it solely 
regulated by DP law, or indeed, to leave it unregulated by law but solely by technologies such 
as filtering.  But spam can also be seen as a problem which is mainly economic, not 
emotional, in impact; which impacts disproportionately on certain industry groups; and affects 
the public interest in general, more than private individuals - and this analysis points towards 
why DP laws are perhaps not the best way to regulate spam after all.  DP laws are mainly 
intended to encourage administrative compliance by responsible businesses, and are ill suited 
either to punishing in a way that hurts those who flagrantly disrespect the law, nor to 
compensating those who suffer financially as a result of spam.  At the moment in the UK, the 
maximum fine for breaching an enforcement order served by the Information Commissioner is 
£5,000 unless the trial goes before a jury, and in practice, prosecutions of any kind are rare to 
non-existent and fines low27. By comparison, ICSTIS, the regulator for breaches of the code of 
usage of premium rate phone lines, has recently imposed fines of up to £75,000 on spammers 
who came under its jurisdiction as they were fraudulently encouraging users to run up charges 
on premium rate lines28.  There are no jail sentences available for even the most persistent 
spammers29.  Individual compensation for victims of breaches of DP law is possible30, but 
there are no reported cases of an individual ever succeeding in gaining damages in the context 
of spam, and given the cost of legal proceedings, the lack of precedents and the likely nominal 
sum that might be awarded, it is unlikely any will arise31.
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Arguably this will exempt most spammers, who just want to make a buck not cause alarm.
26 It is often incredulously asked: “But who actually responds to spam?  How do spammers make money?”  A number of 
explanations are put forward in the literature.  One is that most spammers make money from selling other spammers 
software and mailing lists of spam-able addresses.  A variation on this is that spammers are only trying to obtain personal 
details, not actual customers, so as to perpetrate further frauds and identity thefts.  Another view is that the costs of spam 
are so low and billions of messages so easy to send, that a tiny return rate will still turn a profit.  Victims are also often 
unlikely to complain and reveal their own gullibility so, as frauds go, it is a very safe one.  See further, Sauver J. “The 
Economics of Spam: The Spam Business Isn’t Always What You’d Think” at 
http://cc.uoregon.edu/cnews/summer2003/spameconomics.html.
27 See Annual Report of the UK INofrmation Commisioner 2002-2003 at http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/.
28 See report on ICSTIS v BW Telecom, a New York company reported in The Register, 17 February 2004 at 
http://www.the register.co.uk/content/6/35695.html; ICSTIS’s website reports all such adjudications at 
http:www.icstis.org.uk/.
29 Compare Italy, where jail sentences of up to three years are possible; and Virginia, where a spammer was recently jailed 
under the state spam statute for nine years (see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/3981099.stm ).
30 1998 Act, s 13.
31 Even Naomi Campbell, a global celebrity, was merely awarded nominal damages for the breach of her data privacy 
rights at the first stage of her recent battle with the press in the UK courts - see Campbell v MGN [2002] EWCA Civ 1373. 
(At the Court of Appeal, she then had her DP claim rejected on the grounds the breach of privacy was in the public interest 
– their “right to know” – and although this was reversed in the House of Lords, the DP point was not pursued.) If even Ms 
Campbell only receives nominal damages for breach of DP rights, what would an ordinary mortal be granted?
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Upon whom does spam have the maximum detrimental impact?  The European Commission 
has emphasised in the past, especially when introducing the ECD, that spam is one among 
several factors which fundamentally impedes the growth in public trust in the Internet as a 
serious commercial and social medium, by which governmental as well as private services can 
reliably be delivered.  In this respect, the European debate around spam has begun to resemble 
the older debates around the regulation of encryption and pornography: in both cases, the 
private/moral interest in protection from offensive content, or protection of privacy rights, 
eventually carries less weight than the public/economic argument that unless the Internet is 
cleaned up and made secure for consumers and businesses, electronic commerce cannot 
thrive32.  With spam however, the threat posed to the public interest has become somewhat 
more acute, as it has begun to threaten the potential destruction or at least retardation of the 
information society the EU has tried so strongly to promote.  European Commissioner for the 
Information Society Erik Likannen put it thus in a speech in 2003:
“Combating spam has become a matter for us all and has become one of the most 
significant issues facing the Internet today.  It is a fight over many fronts…  We must 
act before users of e-mails or SMS stop using the Internet or mobile services, or 
refrain from using it to the extent that they otherwise would.33” [emphasis added]
Certain actors suffer particularly direct economic losses as a result of spam.  ISPs, especially 
the largest ones such as AOL, Comcast, BT Internet etc, suffer the brunt of the immediate 
damage.  The sheer bulk of traffic sent out by spammers - who use special spamming software 
to sometimes send tens of millions of messages at one go - uses up bandwidth and slows 
Internet traffic down, not just email but also other services such as the Web.  ISP servers from 
which spam is sent, or to which or through which it is transmitted, may crash, not just as a 
result of the initial volume of mail sent out but because of “mail undeliverable” messages 
returned from inaccurate email addresses.  Smaller ISPs tend to buy only as much bandwidth 
as they need to support the estimated traffic of their known subscribers and massive surges of 
use caused by spammers, often sending vast amounts of spam from or to their server via 
multiple virus-enslaved computers known as “zombie drones”, will tend to crash the ISP’s 
                                                          
32 Dickie has described this as a “market” rather than a “welfarist” focus in regard to regulation of the Internet: see Internet 
and Electronic Commerce Law in the European Union (1999, Hart Publishing), p 101.
33 Speech of 25 July 2003, quoted in DG Information Society Working Paper, Issue Paper for EU Workshop on 
Unsolicited Commercial Communications or Spam, 16 October 2003.
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mail server or require the ISP to waste money buying excess bandwidth as preventative 
strategy.  This represents a major problem to ISP and their system administrators who to retain 
customer confidence (and avoid potential suits for breach of contract) need to provide 24 hour 
access and keep networked workplaces going34.  In AOL v Prime Data Systems Inc35, the court 
estimated that the real costs of AOL of dealing with each spam message were 0.078 cents per 
message.  Since in that case 130 million junk emails were sent, the court awarded $4000, 000
dollars against the spammer (including a punitive triple multiplier on the estimated damages).  
In another case it was estimated that handling spam had so degraded the performance of the 
server afflicted by spamming that emails that should have been delivered in minutes were 
taking three days to arrive36.  Another major cost is filtering and its associated problems.  
Most major ISPs filter spam aggressively in an attempt to service their customer base. AOL 
estimated in 2003 that of the 2.5 billion email messages they delivered a day, nearly 80% were 
spam.  AOL winnows these out, as the costs of filtering out spam are considerably less than 
the costs associated with storing and distributing it, plus efficient spam handling is a positive 
feature in attracting clientele.  However the downside of such proactive filtering is dealing 
with complaints from customers whose emails are wrongly blocked as spam and from 
recipients who fail to receive email which was falsely identified as spam.  Block of such “false 
positives” may lead to valuable transactions falling through and important appointments being 
missed; although the issues of tort or delict law here are uncharted, it is clear that costs accrue 
to ISPs whichever way they decide to “play safe”.  MCI, a large Internet backbone carrier, 
now receive half a million complaints a month that its network is being used to transmit spam, 
and when it succeeds in evicting spammers from its network, finds that they rarely pay their 
accrued bills37.  Less directly, large ISPs suffer brand tarnishing as they are associated with 
spam as their directories of customer addresses can be easily “harvested” and thus tend to be 
heavily spammed.  This damages customer loyalty and branch recognition and may have 
detrimental effects on their capital value or public stock price.
The other group who bear the cost of spam, it is often claimed, are employers.  Spam wastes 
employee time, both when they examine and delete spam, or, worse still, become frustrated  
(or intrigued) and try to reply to it.  Reports (usually commissioned by the writers of spam-
blocking software, and so to be taken with a pinch of salt) repeatedly show that companies 
                                                          
34 Compare the international furore caused, when Microsoft were forced in 2004 by hackers to shut down the free web 
based email system Hotmail for a few hours as a result of its compromise by hackers.  
35 ED Va No 97-1652-A, 12/10/98.
36 Compuserve Inc v Cyber Promotion Inc No C2-96-1070 (SD Ohio 24/20/96).
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lose large amounts of money through spam, with some claiming that employees waste up 10% 
of their day opening and discarding spam email.  Estimates of the annual cost of spam per US 
worker vary between $1400 and $49, depending on the analyst consulted38.  The European 
Union, on whatever calculation, has based its legislative attack on spam on the claim that it is 
costing European businesses more than 2.25 billion Euros a year39.
Spam  law prior to the E-Commerce Directive: the  Data Protection Directive, the 
Distance Selling Directive and the Telecoms Data Protection Directive
The Data Protection Directive (DPD), and its UK implementation in the Data Protection Act 
1998, imposes duties on “data controllers” broadly to (i) to comply with the Data Protection 
Principles40 and (ii) to notify with the Information Commissioner as persons who are 
processing personal data41. If these duties are breached, then the data controller may be liable 
to compensate any individual adversely affected, even if the Commissioner does not serve an 
enforcement notice42, and criminal liability may also be incurred43.  
To determine if DP law regulated spam, then, it was first necessary to decide if spammers are 
“data controllers”. A data controller is defined as “a person who…determines the purposes for 
which and the manner in which personal data are, or are to be, processed.”44 This begs the 
question, do spammers process “personal data”? Typically, spammers harvest from 
newsgroups, web sites or ISP mail programs, buy, or otherwise obtain, long lists of personal e-
mail addresses, to which a spam e-mail is then sent by special software. Under s 1(1) of the 
1998 Act, “Processing” includes “...carrying out any operation on the information or data”, 
which seems to fit these activities satisfactorily.  “Personal data” itself is defined in s 1(1)  as 
“data which relates to a living individual who can be identified (a) from those data, or (b) 
from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or likely to come into the 
possession of, the data controller.” Does an e-mail address, without any other added 
information, identify an individual, in the same way that a name and physical address would? 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
37 See generally, Hansell S. “Diverging Estimates of the Cost of Spam”, New York Times, July 27 2003.
38 Ibid.
39 Cited by BBC News website, 15 July 2003.
40 1998 Act, s 4(4).
41 Ibid, s 17(1).
42 Ibid, s 13.
43 Ibid, s 21.
44 Ibid, s 1(1)).
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There has been doubt on this matter in the past45.  However, the PECD appears clearly to 
assume that email addresses if they do belong to a living person are to be regarded as 
“personal data” and  this is also the approach taken, with some caveats, in guidance supplied 
by the UK Information Commissioner46.
Assuming the 1998 Act does apply to spammers, it was clear that on most occasions, the act 
of spamming would be prima facie in breach of the 1998 Act in multiple ways. For example, 
spammers typically fail to register with the Data Commissioner as required, and also fail to 
respect requirements such as data security and use only for stated purposes.  Most importantly 
however, spammers invariably failed to meet the most significant DP rule, deriving from the 
First Data Protection Principle, that the consent of data subjects to the processing of their data 
must be obtained. Admittedly, such consent is not required if one of the other exemptions in 
Schedule 2 is applicable, but the only one that seems relevant to spam is that the processing is 
“necessary for the purposes of legitimate interests pursued by the data controller” which 
interests must be balanced against the data subject’s rights, especially to privacy47 . If the 
processing is detrimental to the interests of the data subject, as it arguably will always be in 
the case of spam, then the exemption is highly unlikely to exculpate the data controller.  
The DPA 1998 furthermore gave the data subject the specific right under s 11 to demand to 
cease receiving  - or to “opt out” from – the processing of his or her personal data for the 
purposes of direct marketing48 by a data controller. This right was seen as important for 
consumer protection, even though anecdotal evidence showed that consumers rarely had either 
the knowledge or the impetus to seek out data controllers and express their desire to opt out.  
“Opt-out” from traditional direct marketing was facilitated by the creation of the Mailing 
Preference Service, a voluntary “opt out register” run by the Direct Marketing Association49, 
where consumers could register their preference not to receive direct marketing. Direct 
marketers then came by virtue of s 11 under an effective obligation to check the names on the 
register and remove “opt-out” names before they sent out a mail-shot. Similar voluntary 
                                                          
45 See Edwards, supra n 1.
46 See Information Commissioner’s Office DPA 1998: Legal Guidance at p 12, available at 
http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/. 
47 1998 Act, Sched 2, para 6(1).
48 “Direct marketing” is defined for these purposes as “the communication (by whatever means) of any advertising or 
marketing material which is directed to particular individuals” (s 11(3) and so includes spam as well as traditional junk 
mail.




preference services were established for fax and telephone “cold calling”.  No such voluntary 
register however existed specifically for email spam, unsurprisingly as, as noted above, spam 
comes overwhelmingly from spammers who are outside the EU, anonymous and uninterested 
in complying with EC or UK law.  Spammers, of course, nearly always failed to respect the 
opt-out right even where they ostensibly provided an opportunity to opt out within their own 
emails or websites (usually of the “click here if you don’t want to receive any more messages 
of this kind” type). Indeed, usually the spammer’s reply-to email address proved either to be 
false or non-working or, as worst case scenario, to be a trap by means of which the spammers 
could verify the spam victim email address was indeed a valid one. 
Other pieces of EC consumer legislation subsequent to the DPD also provided possible 
opportunities for enhancing protection from spam, but these were repeatedly not exploited, 
mainly due to the fervent opposition of the direct marketing industry. Consumers were, for 
example, guaranteed the right under the EC Distance Selling Directive 199750 not to receive 
unsolicited communications relating to distance selling from a business where they clearly 
objected51. This Directive, being of later vintage, was more clearly intended than the DPD to 
cover communications sent via the Internet as well as conventional mail and phone 
communications.52 However since it again mandated only an “opt-out” regime, effectively it 
required no more protection be given by the UK in relation to spam than s 11 of the DPA 
1998 already gave53.  An “opt-in” minimum requirement, by contrast, would have meant that 
member states were required to legislate so that consumers would actually have to express a 
prior preference to receive unsolicited communications from the business in question before it 
would be legal for them to be sent such communications. Given consumer inertia, it was 
obvious (to everyone but the direct marketing industry) that such an approach would generally 
be more effective at controlling the increasing problem of spam, and protecting consumer 
privacy.  It was not however at this time seen as the politically appropriate solution, at least in 
the UK, though several EC member states , notably Germany and Austria, did voluntary adopt 
an “opt-in” regime (and thus ban spam) relatively early on.
                                                          
50 Directive 97/7/EC, OJ No L 144/19. See further, Nordhausen A in Chapter 8 of this volume and Appendices.
51 Art 10(1), Distance Selling Directive.
52 See Art 2 of the DSD and Annex 1, which specifically refers to “electronic mail”.
53 The consultation paper issued by the DTI in November 1999 included draft regulations which contained alternate opt-out 
and opt-in schemes -  however an opt-out scheme was in the end chosen.  
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Similarly, the Telecommunications Data Protection Directive 199754, implemented in the UK 
by  the Telecommunications (Data Protection and Privacy) (Direct Marketing) Regulations 
199855, was introduced to deal with the growing problem of unsolicited telephone calls and 
faxes and  was aimed at cutting down on such “cold calling” against the wishes of consumers.  
Article  12 of this Directive again gave states discretion to implement  using either an “opt-in” 
or “opt-out” system,  and again, the DTI chose after consultation to opt for the latter, so that  
those who wished not to receive unsolicited “calls” still had to register their opt-out (with, this 
time, the Telephone Preference Service) to achieve this effect.  The DTI also made it clear 
during the consultation period on implementing the Telecoms Directive, that the Regulations, 
and in particular, the word “calls”, were not to be interpreted to include e-mail solicitations56
and thus even the mild regime of opt-out was not extended to unsolicited email either 
(although mobile phone text messages were deemed to be included in the word “calls” and 
thus, slightly oddly, did fall within the regime.) 
It became clear that there were two clear problems with both the Distance Selling Directive 
and the DPA 1998 in relation to spam. First, the jurisdictional and resources difficulties of 
enforcing EU and UK rules against predominantly American spammers were almost 
insuperable. But secondly, even leaving the enforcement difficulties aside, the “opt-out” 
regime which both sets of rules imposed, was of very little practical help. Human nature is 
such that even faced with a constant source of annoyance, very few people are equipped to 
find out that a regulatory scheme exists which may help them, and even fewer will then make 
the effort to register their veto on spam. Most independent commentators agreed that an opt-in 
scheme for spam would be more appropriate, under which consumers would have to indicate 
(however bizarrely57) their actual desire to receive spam.  Interestingly, the Distance Selling 
Directive of 1997 had already prescribed a very limited mandatory  “opt-in” regime for junk 
faxes and automated calling machines58, machines which repetitively call certain telephone 
numbers and then either  hang up, play a pre-recorded message or connect the consumer to a 
                                                          
54 97/66/EC. The Regulations came into force on 1 May 1999.
55 SI 1998 No 3170.
56 See Telecoms Data Protection Directive Implementation In the UK – Draft Regulations, para 2.3.
57 It has however been argued that “opt-in” is rather easier for the seller  to secure in relation to business-to-consumer 
(B2C) e-commerce than in the traditional postal or catalogue distance selling domain. Any consumer who buys something 
from a web site can be offered a box to click if they want to “receive further information”. This will do as “opt-in”; there is 
no need for it be done via a central register as with “opt-out”, so for small businesses, “opt-in” may actually be a cheaper 
regime under which to operate than “opt-out” where search fees of the opt-out register will be a significant overhead.
58 See Art 12(1). It is noteworthy that even in the US, the home of free speech, automated calling machines are banned 
(although enforcement of this is patchy) and this ban has been upheld as constitutional (see Moser v Federal 
Communications Commission 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1995).
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human salesperson (if one is available)when the call is answered. The reason why these means 
of selling were distinguished from ordinary distance selling was, in the case of faxes, because 
the costs of marketing were transferred from seller to recipient, and in the case of automated 
calling machines, because of the extreme aggravation they caused. Both reasons applied just 
as strongly to spam, and therefore the case grew ever more compelling for the EC to 
unambiguously prescribe an opt-in regime for spam, especially as spam ceased to be a minor 
consumer problem, and became the scourge of the Internet around the turn of the millennium. 
The Electronic Commerce Directive
At this point therefore, it was particularly puzzling and frustrating that the drafters of the ECD 
failed to grasp the nettle and impose a spam opt-in regime on reluctant member states such as 
the UK.   Attempts were made in the European Parliament during the passage of the ECD 
both to ban both spam and cookies outright (see further below) but these were in the end 
repelled. Instead the EC Commission restricted the reforms introduced by the ECD in this 
connection to some rather redundant transparency provisions in Arts 6 and 7. First,  Art 6 
required that (all) “commercial communications59” had to  be “transparent” in the sense that 
certain information had to be made available which identified the sender, adequately disclosed 
the nature and conditions of promotional offers made by the communication, etc60.  In many 
respects, these requirements duplicated the work already done in the Distance Selling 
Directive.  Secondly, only unsolicited commercial communications had to be “identifiable 
clearly and unambiguously” as such to the recipient as soon as they arrive61. The obvious way 
to implement such labelling in the case of spam is by requiring a word such as “advertising” 
to appear on the subject line of any spam e-mail.  Spam filters can then in theory read the label 
and filter out the message. The UK Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 do 
not go into that degree of detail, however, merely demanding in addition to the general rule 
transposed from the Directive that  any promotional offer or promotional competition or game 
be clearly identified (along with its qualifying or participation conditions)62. Even if labelling 
is adopted by sellers, it is not much of a solution to spam. It may spare the sensibilities of 
                                                          
59 Defined in the UK Regulations (see n 62 infra) , reg 2 as (with exceptions) “a communication, in any form designed to 
promote, directly or indirectly, the goods, services or image of any person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft 
activity, or exercisig a regulated profession”. The exceptions are a communication which contains merely an address, 
domain name or email address;  and a communication promoting A but sent by an independent person B.
60 The Commission has suggested that such information might satisfactorily be provided by a hyperlink in the case of a web 
page making a commercial communication; such a link could also be placed in an email. .
61 Art 7(1).
62 SI 2002/1931, regs 7 and 8.
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recipients who are spared the experience of opening a message labelled (say) “Advertising: 
red hot porn”, but will do little for the more economic problems caused by spam discussed 
above, eg, the on-line time they waste being downloaded and deleted, and the clogging up of 
Internet bandwidth. Labelling will give email filtering systems a tag to act upon , but may also 
interfere with users forwarding spam to ISP postmasters and other spam “vigilantes” so that 
they can be “blacklisted” (see below) as they are currently encouraged to do. In any case, the 
practical evidence since the ECD was implemented in 2002 is that again, spam coming from 
outside the EC (and probably from within it as well) has resolutely ignored these injunctions. 
Enforcement certainly requires, even within the EC, a considerable budget for investigation, 
given the ease of falsifying one’s origins on the Internet and the untraceability of most 
spammers operating from free ISP accounts and “zombie drones”.  Finally, on the great “opt-
in” debate, Art 7 finally provided merely that states must “respect the opt-out registers”; a 
provision so redundant that the UK Regulations did not even transpose it.
The Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive
It was thus left to the Privacy and Electronic Communications Directive 200263 to finally 
make some significant legal headway in Europe against the vice of spam.  Article 13(1) of the 
PECD finally grasps the nettle and demands that all EU member states require prior consent –
“opt in” – to the use of personal data to send junk electronic mail.  “Electronic mail” further 
more is widely defined to include “any text, voice, sound or image message sent over a public 
communications network which can be stored in the network or in the recipient’s terminal 
equipment until it is collected by the recipient”64. This is a clear attempt to make the Directive 
“technology neutral” and less prone to immediate obsolescence as new forms of both 
communication and communications tools are invented and become popular. At present, this 
certainly covers not only email, but voicemail, video messaging to 3-G smartphones, text 
massages to phones, and more. It is interesting to ask why finally after so many lost 
opportunities the EC has caved in and demanded “opt-in” to spam. One reason clearly is 
harmonisation – for many businesses, clarity on what they have to do throughout Europe is 
more important than the actual shape of the rule – but it is also down to the admission by the 
direct marketing industry itself that spam in its current form has rendered their industry 
untrustworthy and unprofitable; in short, most sentient human beings will delete unread any 
                                                          
63  See n 4 supra.
64 Art 2 (h), PECD.
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unsolicited mail message from unknown sender as fast as  humanly possible, whether it comes 
from a respectable high street brand business, or from a  Nigerian offering to deposit 
$8,000,000 in your account. Only by re-establishing a culture of trust via prior consent, the 
argument goes, can “responsible” direct marketing businesses operate effectively on the 
Internet again.
So far, so good. There are, however, significant exceptions to the new “opt-in to spam” rule. 
Prior consent is not required if the details of the recipient were previously obtained “in the 
context of a sale of a product or service” so long as 
 (a) the recipient is given a clear, simple and free opportunity to opt-out of receiving 
spam each time a new communication is sent, and
  (b) the goods or services were “similar” to those now being marketed65. 
Privacy advocates might suggest that the correct way to interpret this provision is to regard the 
exception as only operating where an actual prior sale had occurred – ie, not where the 
consumer had merely browsed the site to check out goods, decided not to buy, but perhaps
inadvertently given away their details, eg, by having to register to gain access to the website; 
or by the collection of data via cookies (see below). The UK Regulations however take a 
different approach. So long as the business has legitimately obtained the contact details (in 
terms of the requirements of DP law concerning fair collection and processing), details can be 
used if they have been obtained in the course of the “sale or negotiations” [italics added]. Is 
merely browsing a site, perhaps to gain information or for price comparison, “negotiations”?  
Guidance from the Information Commissioner – who is of course perhaps more privacy-
oriented than the DTI  - suggests that “negotiations” require some kind of  active expression 
of interest by the data subject in the company’s products  and certainly do not include the case 
where all that has happened has been the browse of a site and deposit of a cookie66. It remains 
to be seen how courts or regulators will interpret this clause when or if a dispute arises. 
And what are “similar” goods or services? No elaboration is given in the Regulations but, 
again, according to the DTI during the consultation period, this should only be restricted by 
the reasonable expectations of the buyer at the time they gave their contact details. To give an 
illustrative example of the DTI approach, if a consumer buys baked beans on-line from 
Tesco’s,  it seems reasonable for Tesco’s to then market TVs and DVDs (say) to that 
                                                          
65 Art 13(2), PECD.
66 Guidance to the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Part 1: Marketing by 
Electronic Means available at http://www.informationcommissioner.gov.uk/ ..
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consumer without prior consent, because the consumer could reasonably have known that 
Tesco’s sold all these types of goods at the time she first gave away her personal information; 
however if Tesco’s, subsequent to the baked bean purchase, acquired , say, a horse-riding 
stables business , it would not be reasonable for them to market horse-riding lessons to the 
consumer, as she could not have reasonably expected Tesco’s to offer that service67. The 
Information Commissioner guidance also focuses on the idea of “reasonable expectation” and 
the availability of opt-out if the goods diverge from what the consumer expects to receive. 
Does the average consumer really view baked beans and TV sets, plain and simply, as “similar 
goods”? This seems a technical and privacy-minimising interpretation, which is unlikely to be 
harmonious with several other member states which have already banned spam entirely and 
long ago -  nor is it likely to instill the trust in consumers which is the whole object of the 
exercise.
What else does the PECD do to prevent spam? Article 12 (implemented in the UK 
Regulations, reg 18) strengthens the right of an on-line subscriber to withdraw their name 
from an on-line public directory of subscribers eg an AOL  customer could ask for their email 
address not to be visible on a publicly accessible list of AOL subscribers.  Since spam mailing 
lists were often culled in the past from easily harvestable open directories of ISP customers, 
this is a useful right for individuals. 
Finally as noted above, the UK PECD regulations are significant in going some small way 
towards extending the protection of DP law to juristic persons as well as living individuals. 
Regulation 22, as discussed above, extends only to individual users, not to “corporate 
subscribers” as defined in the Regulations. As Carey notes68, this is not that crucial an 
omission, as most spam emails sent to businesses will still go to a named individual’s email 
inbox and fall within the rules; only spam emails addressed explicitly to the business name 
would remain legal. But Regulation 2369, which makes it unlawful to send a marketing email 
with no valid return address, or with the identity of the sender disguised or concealed, does
apply to emails received by corporate subscribers, thus providing UK companies as such with 
their first real remedy in the fight against spam.
                                                          
67 Interstingly, the Art 29 Working Party Opinion on Art 13 of Directive 2002/58/EC also emphasises that “only the same  
natural or legal person that collected the data may send marketing emails… subsidiaries or mother companies are not the 
ame company.” (para 3.5, 11601/EN WP 90, 27 February 2004).
68 Carey P Data Protection (2nd edn, OUP, 2004), Chapter 12.
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Assessment of legal solutions to spam, and alternative solutions to spam
The PECD brings one chapter in the battle to regulate spam by law to an end. The “opt-in” 
wars are over. But it still has to be asked, as it has been repetitively in this chapter, if this 
time-consuming hard-fought legal effort has been worthwhile. What will happen to spammers 
who continue to operate without obtaining prior consent? Spammers mostly operate outside 
Europe and pay little attention to European law; they are generally very hard to trace; even if 
traced they can move swiftly from server to server in different countries; even if found, the 
work needed to bring them within European enforcement jurisdiction will be enormous; the 
resources to fight spam in this way simply do not exist in most European countries where 
spam law enforcement is primarily the remit of the under-funded data protection authorities. 
There are very many spammers and very few data protection officials. To adopt Peter Swire’s 
useful metaphor, spammers are “mice” not “elephants”70. To add insult to injury, as noted 
above, DP sanctions in most of Europe are hardly at the punitive level which would seriously 
cripple a determined spammer or put others off entering the trade, the obvious message is that 
there has to be a better way to fight spam than this.
The Americans, with more years of experience at fighting spam via the law than we 
Europeans, are faring no better.  Impeded, as in Europe, by the lobbying forces of the direct 
marketing industry as well as by constitutional concerns about free commercial speech, the 
recent US Federal Can-Spam Act of 2003 is widely regarded as a damp squib and even by 
some more radical anti-spam campaigners as actively promoting spam. The main planks of the 
Can-Spam Act are (a) mandatory opt-out (not opt-in) and (b) prohibition of false or deceptive 
subject lines to spam email. “Sexually oriented” spam must also be identifiable in advance by 
a warning label. So far, so very similar to European law at the stage of the ECD: and we have 
already seen how effective that was. The US’s own relevant enforcement body, the Federal 
Trade Commission, is so unconvinced of the benefits of opt-out that it has indicated its 
unwillingness to set up a “Do-Not-Spam” register to implement opt-out, on the perfectly 
sensible ground that such a public list will simply be used by spammers as a validated list of 
email addresses ripe to receive yet more spam71. To be fair, the US has the advantage over 
Europe of having a high proportion of spammers within its enforcement jurisdiction; and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
69 Implementing Art 13(4) of the PECD.
70 See Swire P “Of Elephants, Mice and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Internet”  32 International Lawyer 
991 – the metaphor of elephants and mice is then adapted to the landscape of on-line privacy in Edwards L “Reconstructing 
Consumer Privacy Protection On-Line: A Modest Proposal” (2004) 18 Int Rev Law Computers and Technology 313 .
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Act also goes further in some ways than the ECD or even the PECD, particularly in
prohibiting the use of third party computers (“open relays” or “zombie drones”) to send spam 
without the consent of that computer’s owner. These provisions get nearer to the heart of what 
might actually make spam unworkable as opposed to traditional privacy and consumer law 
solutions. Most ISPs nowadays prevent any subscriber, guest or paying, named or anonymous,  
sending out mail-shots in the bulk  which spammers need to use to have any hope of profit –
that is, millions not thousands of messages. Spam is therefore now overwhelmingly sent either 
from ISPs or servers in developing countries which have no effective legal regulation in this 
area, from mail-server machines which have been, contrary to good security practice, left open 
so anyone can use them to send mail, not just registered users of that server (“open relays”) -
or far more commonly now, from networks of “zombie drones”72. These are computers which, 
usually by means of a virus infection (or “trojan horse”), have been “enslaved” by a remote 
user (the spammer, or zombie network owner) usually entirely without the knowledge of that
computer’s legitimate user or owner. If the enslaved computer has mail-server software on it, 
or (more commonly) if that software can be implanted by a virus attached to the spam email, 
then the “zombie” can be used to send out spam without any of the usual problems of getting 
it past an ISP’s safeguards.  Legal provisions such as those in the Can-Spam Act making it 
plain that creating “zombie drones” is itself a crime in spam law, are thus extremely useful, 
though again, hardly easy to enforce without detailed computer forensic help. 
A second useful provision in the Can-Spam Act is a ban on falsifying the header information 
or origin of the email sent by spammers. Again, one of the key technical tricks spammers use 
is always to disguise the true origin of their messages, perhaps by using proxy servers, 
“zombie drones” as discussed above,  and anonymisers to modify originating IP address, as 
well as by more obvious tricks such as using dud return mail addresses. This prevents their 
being traced by law enforcement authorities or besieged by angry replies from disgruntled 
spam recipients. It also prevents the spam messages easily being caught by ISPs  and system 
administrators who filter out email from known spamming domains and addresses.  Thus 
again it is a sensible legal strategy to ban the falsification of email origin data. This 
prohibition arguably exists in UK law on the  basis of common law fraud as well as regulation 
23 of the PECD regulations, but it is not entirely clear how far modifying header information, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
71 See “Do-Not-Email list is pointless, reasons FTC” at www.Out-Law.com, 17 June 2004.
72 See for example,  Leydon J “Zombie PCs spew out 80% of spam” at The Register, 4 June 2004 
(http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/06/04/trojan_spam_study/ ) reporting that four fifths of spam now emanates from 
computers contaminated with Trojan horse infections. Many well-known viruses are sent out, the report claims, purely to 
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say, as opposed to providing a false name or a non-existent email return address, would be  a 
breach of regulation 23.  The US clear statute law reference to “origin of email” is to be 
preferred to the PECD emphasis on “identity of sender”.
But although both these provisions are helpful to the cause of stamping out spam, again both 
fall foul to the  problems of the resources needed for investigation, the number of spammers, 
the jurisdictional problems and the huge forensic difficulties of establishing that a particular 
Trojan horse virus (say) was released by a particular spammer. Just as in Europe, spam 
volume in the US has continued inexorably to rise, even since the Can-Spam Act came into 
force on 1 January 200473. While it is of course essential to criminalise or otherwise sanction 
the activities that enable spamming, passing laws is really only a first and rather unsatisfactory 
step in the process of catching spammers or blocking spam activity. Would it not be better to 
concentrate the effort that has gone into legal solutions into technical solutions which might 
actually, conceivably succeed in reducing the actual volume of spam?  Concentrating on 
technical standards rather than laws also has the key advantage that technology largely 
operates on a global basis. Difficult though the task still is, it is surely easier to get a few 
major IT players (all of whom hate spam) to agree on standards, than it is to globally 
harmonise legal regulation of spam via the slow and tortuous domain of international treaty 
making74. A third point is that although the EU has attempted to draft “technology-neutral” 
laws to fight spam and more generally protect consumer privacy, it has inevitably and 
continually lagged behind in the spam “arms race”. Technical standards in their nature would 
have at least a better chance of dictating to spammers, rather than, as is currently the case, 
spammers using technology to outwit and out-race the law.
Technical solutions – the answer?
Within the knowledgeable Internet community itself, there has been consensus for several 
years that the best results will come not from legal regulation, but from “self regulation” by 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
establish networks of compromised machines as future spam relays.
73 However “sexually explicit spam” has reportedly dropped by 78% since January 2004 reported the Internet company 
Postini, in October 2004. This bolsters the view taken in this article that spam regulation  is mainly about economic loss 
and gain and not about “privacy” primarily.
74 The EU have continually attempted for the last few years to broker international co-operation on spam, particularly 
between the EU and USA, as has the UN organization, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), but the process 
remains slow despite mutual good intentions. Even intra-EU co-operation on spam  law enforcement has been difficult to 
achieve. See latest communications from the EU Commission  at 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/146&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLangu
age=en on encouragement of cross-Europe spam hotlines accessible to all EU citizens for the reporting of spam, and EDRI 
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technical strategies75. There are a number of less or more successful approaches. The first line 
of defense has always been that ISPs, local network managers, and individual users can use 
filtering software to winnow out e-mails sent from the addresses (IP addresses and/or URLs) 
of known spammers. This however is only ever partially effective as the addresses of 
spammers change constantly and are in any case, as described above, usually disguised. There 
is some degree of co-operative “blacklisting” of sites and ISPs known to harbour spammers:
one such blacklist often consulted by system administrators is known as the Real Time Black 
Hole List and is available on the Web76. Traffic coming from a blacklisted site will not be 
transmitted on via other networks or ISPs where administrators have consulted the blacklist, 
with the effect that the black-listed site becomes isolated from the rest of the Internet, 
effectively “sent to Coventry”. However no such system is foolproof, and a site which is being 
unknowingly made use of by spammers against its own policies (a “zombie drone” perhaps),
or one which is sending out multiple copies of an e-mail for a valid reason (eg an alumni e-
mailing from a university) may find itself black-listed alongside the “guilty” sites.  It has also 
been suggested that mistaken placing of a site on the list might be seen as libelous, which 
provides a disincentive to co-operate in providing information to the organizers or re-
publishing the list.  Philosophically, Lawrence Lessig, the highly respected Internet law guru, 
has lead a movement against “black hole lists” on the ground that they represent undemocratic 
unaccountable vigilante justice77. An extreme solution is to use a “white-list” ie, only accept 
email from a list of prior approved senders: this has obvious difficulties for agencies such as 
the government and universities, which constantly receive enquiries from strangers, as well as 
for most individuals.
The most currently promising technical solutions involve variations on configuring email 
servers, or more radically, redesigning the email standard format itself, to make it possible to 
spot any attempt to falsify or disguise the true origin of an e-mail message. Filtering out all 
mail with fake reply addresses or falsified header information will effectively filter out almost 
all spam. Promising attempts are being made, notably by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force) and a loose confederation of major industry players (the Anti-Spam Alliance78) to 
develop what are known as “trusted email systems”: systems where, by various different 
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75 See Dallman and Dowling, supra n 7 and Edwards (2000), supra n 1.
76 Run by the Mail Abuse Protection System (MAPS). See further http://maps.vix.com.
77 See Lessig L “The Spam Wars”, December 31 1998 at http://www.lessig.org/content/standard/0,1902,3006,00.html . 
Lessig’ attitude may have been coloured by the fact that his former employer, Harvard University, was at one time black-
listed on the Real Time Black Hole List.
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means, the standard format of email is altered so that the true domain origin of a message is 
always apparent and cannot be successfully disguised. Email can thus always be authenticated 
as coming from a verifiable, and traceable, source; if it does not, it is spam and can be filtered 
out or bounced back. There are many obstacles still in the way of developing a trusted email 
system acceptable to all players – technological interoperability, proprietary standards and 
patents, trade secrets, industry rivalry, and privacy concerns about the possible loss of 
anonymised email – but in the end this is likely to be the most promising route to stamping 
out spam. It is quite possible that in five years technology may have succeeded where law has 
failed and succeeded in removing spam from the regulatory agenda.
Economic solutions
While we wait for technology to do its stuff, another set of possible answers to the spam 
problem has emerged which might be termed economic solutions79. These start from the not 
unobvious observation that spam is based on the fact that spamming costs spammers almost 
nothing regardless of how many emails are sent80. Both senders and receivers of email largely 
pay almost zero to send and receive spam, despite that fact that spam does have marginal 
costs, such as electricity, storage and network congestion. These costs are , however absorbed 
by persons other than the spammer. So for the spammer “this represents a sure-win strategy: 
mail as much as you can, because even one hit out of a million is profitable”81. The obvious 
solution then is to charge (on top of dial-up or broadband costs) for sending each email. This 
will of course be unpopular with ordinary, non-spammer, users; but if the charge is kept very 
low, then arguably it will only really bite as an economic disincentive against those (like 
spammers) who send out millions, not tens or even hundreds of emails per day. With this in 
mind, Bill Gates, CEO of Microsoft, proposed in early 2004 that an email “postage stamp” be 
purchased before email could be sent82. Set at a very low figure, of say, 0.01 cent per item, this 
would barely scrape the pockets of ordinary users but would be a real financial burden for 
spammers. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
78 The group includes Yahoo!, Microsoft, EarthLink and America Online.
79 It is interesting to note that spam as a problem has now engaged all four of the modalities of regulation Lessig famously 
identified in his seminal text Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999). Spam was originally tackled by 
norms in the form of netiquette and flaming, as doled out by the early Internet community to the original Green Card 
spammers; then by law; then (or simultaneously) by “code”; and now finally solutions are emerging from looking at how 
the market propagates spam.
80 See Leyden J “The economics of spam”, The Register, 4 March 2004 at http://www.theregister.co.uk .
81 “Make ‘em pay”, The Economist, February 14 2002.
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Although in some ways an attractive idea, charging for email has so far failed to gather 
overwhelming support. Many critics voice concerns in principle about abandoning the 
democratising and free speech advantages of “free” email. What, for example, of non-
commercial community information sites which send out notifications concerning, say, breast 
cancer news, or important public meetings to thousands of subscribers? Free “weblog” sites 
also often regularly send out many hundreds of thousands of emails notifying participants of 
comments to their postings.  Handling the many millions of micro-payments a “postage 
stamp” system would demand is also problematic. Would such payments be made in only one 
currency or every local currency? Who would collect them – the ISP? Who would oversee 
their collection mechanisms and enforce the “postage stamp” regime? What would be done 
with the money? The area is fraught with unanswered concerns. One possible retrenchment 
would be to make a would-be email sender do a short puzzle before they sent an email, with 
no monetary payment involved:  plausible in time costs, it is argued, for a sender of a single 
email, but not for a spammer sending millions. However a quick and highly unscientific straw 
poll by this author found that ordinary users were even more unwilling to waste time doing 
puzzles to send their everyday email than they were to pay for “postage stamps”. A final, 
slightly more promising wrinkle, is to ask senders not to actually pay in advance, but to put a 
certain sum of money up front as a bond or guarantee83: if the email they send is then rejected 
by the intended recipient as spam, the bond comes into operation, and a cost per email would 
be deducted. However a solution like this virtually requires recipients involved in the scheme 
to maintain a “white-list” of who they are willing to receive email from; which as noted 
above, is for many individuals and associations who anticipate email from strangers as well as 
friends, not a practical exercise.
Another quasi-economic approach focuses on enforcement of anti-spamming laws. As we 
have noted above, one of the obstacles to the success of all spam laws is the vast amount of 
spammers, the difficulties of bringing them to justice, and the limited amount of resources 
which can be devoted by law enforcement agencies, both criminal and civil, to the project. 
Lessig has suggested that one way round this would be for the law to offer a “bounty” to
private individuals who track down spammers. His proposal is for a law which would (a) 
require effective and mandatory labeling of all spam messages in their header so they could be 
filtered out – eg, by words such as “SPAM” or “ADVERT”; and (b) allot a “bounty” of, say 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
82 See “Fee-based Email Way To can Spam?”, March 5 2004, at http:///www.CBSnews.com,.
83 The Economist, supra n 81, cites IronPort Systems in Silicon valley as already offering such a bond system to 
“legitimate bulk emailers” so they can differentiate themselves from spammers.
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10c per spam message to an individual who tracked down and produced evidence that a 
spammer had broken this law. The “bounty” would be paid out of the fine imposed on the 
spammer once successfully prosecuted, and to reduce transaction costs, would be limited to 
cases involving the sending of at least 100 or more spam emails84. Superficially this seems a 
strange suggestion from a man who strenuously opposed in public the “vigilante code justice” 
of “black hole lists” (see above). However Lessig argues that while black-hole listers are using 
“code” to make their own rules as to who should be punished for alleged spamming, without 
legal backing or evidential hearings, his bounty system merely employs effective incentives to 
enforce constitutional anti-spam laws made by normal democratic processes. “[W]ith 
automated black holes, no judgment is required before harm is done, nor do the victims have 
any effective appeal.85” Lessig’s argument sufficiently convinced a US member of Congress to 
introduce a Bill based on these principles, though it has not come into force. 
The argument, although neat, can again be criticised. The “bounty” system is dependent 
financially on the successful prosecution of spammers once tracked down, which implies their 
being brought before the jurisdiction of the local courts with attachable assets. This may be a 
plausible assumption in the US, where the majority (though only just) of spammers are still 
based, but it is not a realistic expectation in Europe. (It also assumes successful prosecution, 
which surely cannot always be guaranteed.) From a constitutional perspective, would it not be 
better to use realistic and punitive fines paid by spammers (an excellent idea in principle86) to 
provide adequate funding (possibly in arrears) to existing agencies87, already trained, 
accountable and responsible for tracking down spammers rather than pass it to “trigger-happy” 
private bounty hunters with no knowledge of law, evidence, jurisdiction, human rights or due 
process?
Further challenges to consumer privacy: cookies, traffic data, locational data and the 
PECD
                                                          
84 See account in McCullough D “A Modest Proposal To End Spam”, April 28 2003, at http://news.com.com and also 
infra.
85 Lessig L “Code-Breaking: A Bounty on Spammers”, September 16 2002 , at http://www.cioinsight.com/.
86 This is an area where UK DP law can certainly learn from US law. The Can-Spam Act provides for fixed damage levels 
of up to $100 per email sent to a cap of $2 million, or triple that amount if  state attorneys prosecute in criminal courts. 
Compare the UK maximum penalty of £5,000 in DP law (unless a jury trial is convened) and the actual highest fine in the 
last statistical year of around £3,000.
87 This writer has also proposed another model for the better funding of agencies such as the Information Commissionwr’s 
Office to meet under-resourced challenges such as the prevention of spam: see Edwards L “Reconstructing Consumer 
Privacy Protection On-Line: A Modest Proposal” (2004) 18 Int Rev Law Computers and Technology 313
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The PECD deals not only with spam, but with a variety of challenges to consumer and on-line 
privacy which the Data Protection Directive was perceived as not being able to manage
satisfactorily. Indeed, the explicit intention of the PECD is to update the DPD for the Internet 
era. Recital 5 states that “New advanced digital technologies are currently being introduced in 
public communications network  in the Community, which give rise to specific requirements 
concerning the protection of personal data and the privacy of the user… The successful cross-
border development of [digital network] services is partly dependent on the confidence of 
users that their privacy will not be at risk.” The PECD thus attempts to regulate not just spam 
but other threats to on line privacy such as, notably, cookies. Challengingly, the intention is 
also to be “technology neutral”,  ie, to set up rules which may fairly and effectively regulate 
technologies not yet in existence as well as those already in the market. Whether the PECD 
actually achieves this goal is something we will briefly consider in this chapter’s conclusion.
Cookies
Cookies are small text files (usually less than 1 Kbyte in size) which reside on the local hard 
disc of the computer, or terminal equipment of, a user, and contain a limited amount of profile 
information about that user88. Cookies are usually visible to users if you know where to look 
(the directories they are stored in depend on the configuration of the system, eg 
C;/Windows/Cookies) but frequently, the information in the cookie even if located will be 
apparently gibberish to the user, because it is merely acting as a unique identifier which 
connects the computer where it has been deposited, to information held server-side by the 
business which deposited the cookie.  Typically, cookies are used on e-commerce sites such as 
Amazon, Ebay, etc. When a user browses such a site, or buys an item,  then personal 
information  is collected – what pages he views, what search terms he types in, what images 
he clicks on, what items he selects – and  stored in the website’s server –side database. That 
information is then connected to the user on subsequent repeat visits to that site via the cookie 
which acts to identify the user. (Sites cannot simply use IP address to recognize the user as 
many users access the Internet via ISPs such as AOL which dynamically assign different IP 
addresses to users each time they log in.) 
Cookies of this kind are very useful to e-commerce businesses – and to on-line advertisers –
as they enable a profile of the user’s shopping habits and preferences to be built up. User X, 
                                                          
88 See Sharpe A “The Way the Cookie Crumbles” (2002) 2 Privacy & Data Protection 6.
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for example, may be revealed by cookies to be repeatedly surfing various websites which sell 
Nike or other brand trainers. This is valuable information, which can be used by the business 
itself, sold to competing businesses or to advertisers or used in combination with other 
information for data mining purposes89. Cookies of this kind are also useful to users: they 
enable sits to know you are, in essence, and are sometimes said to give the site a “memory”; 
there is no need to log in every time, and data such as delivery addresses and credit card 
details can usefully be remembered and filled in automatically for the user. Cookies of this 
kind are called “persistent” cookies, because they are not deleted but remain on the hard disc 
of the user more or less indefinitely. “Session” cookies are a very different animal. These are 
used as a technical device to maintain continuity during one Internet website browsing 
session. Session cookies are deleted at the end of the visit to a particular website and do not 
normally involve the processing of personal data or any possible invasion of personal privacy.
Cookies became an object of contention during the debates over the 2002 Electronic 
Commerce Directive, when the European Parliament became aware that personal information 
about consumers browsing the Internet was being collected using cookies and processed in 
large amounts, usually without the consumers’ consent, and almost invariably without even 
their knowledge. So horrified were the Parliament, that, at one point, the total banning of 
cookies without explicit prior consent appeared to be on the cards, to the utter consternation of 
European industry90. The matter was not resolved within the ECD and by the time of the 
PECD, as ever, a compromise had been reached. The final version enshrined in Art 5(3) of the 
PECD requires merely that cookies may only be set if the consumer “is supplied with clear 
and comprehensive information... about the purposes of the processing, and is offered the 
right to refuse such processing by the data controller” [italics added]. 
This is in many ways an extremely watered down version of the original intent which was to 
introduce a positive opt-in requirement in relation to cookies, just as was eventually the case 
with spam. Instead, the provision retains an opt-out system, albeit with added requirements of 
clear information. It seems that in Europe, cookies may no longer be simply invisibly set and 
collected. But how will this information and opt-out opportunity be supplied? Will a hyperlink 
to a privacy policy be sufficient? What if the privacy policy is unintelligible? In the 
UMIST/UK Information Commissioner study of compliance of websites with data protection 
                                                          
89 See further Edwards L and Howells G Anonymity, Consumers and the Internet: Where Everyone Knows You’re A Dog”
in Nicoll C,  Prins and van Dellen eds. Digital Anonymity and the Law (Asser Press, 2003).
90 See Mackay and Lomas “The Cookie Monster” (2002) Computers and Law, vol 12, issue 6, p 14.
28
law91, the study team found only 5% of privacy policies were intelligible to the average 
consumer, using recognised plain English indices. What if (as seems anecdotally to be the 
case) consumers never read privacy policies anyway? What if a tick box is supplied, already 
ticked, which gives permission to set cookies, unobtrusively tucked away at the bottom of the 
page? Or a box whose rubric reads “Tick this box if you don’t want us to set cookies”, so 
putting the onus on the unsuspecting consumer? Neither of these would surely have been 
acceptable under a requirement of explicit prior consent, but may well be in an opt-out 
regime. The PECD recitals, from a consumer point of view, provide both bad and good news 
here. “Information and the right to refuse, “ runs recital 25 of the PECD, “may be offered 
once... also covering any further use.” So it seems that if the consumer once has an “opt-out” 
style tick box offered to her on her first visit to a particular web site, and fails to notice it and 
take the appropriate action (assuming she even knows what it means), she need never be 
offered it again; and meanwhile persistent cookies can be set which will continue to gather 
information every time she subsequently visits that site.  On the other hand, the recital goes on 
to require that “the method for giving information, offering a right to refuse or requesting 
consent should be made as user friendly as possible”. One might hope that this might rule out 
the scenario described above.92 However, leaving such important detail to the recital part of 
the Directive will do little for European uniformity, an obvious problem when websites 
largely operate without notice of or concern for national boundaries.
Another interesting point in Art 5(3) is that setting cookies is allowed without consent where 
“strictly necessary in order to provide an information society service explicitly requested by 
the subscriber or user” [italics added]. Many web sites at present, whether by intent or 
laziness, are designed not to work without cookies. These are however often cookies of the 
non-privacy invasive, session cookie type. Some will work without cookies, but not as well; 
the Amazon site is a good example of this, as it (unusually)  provides fairly good functionality 
without cookies, but popular features such as the “shopping cart” and “your preferences” do 
disappear. Many sites simply fall over if the user chooses to “turn off” or delete the persistent 
cookies for that site cookies. So depending on the interpretation of “strictly necessary”, this 
provision may well be an open invitation to bypass the requirement of consent at all - in other 
                                                          
91  This survey is unfortunately no longer available on the Web but can no doubt be obtained from the Information 
Commissioner’s office.
92 The NCC survey Consumer Privacy in the Information Age (December 1999, PD65/L/99) spoke to focus groups of 
consumers about privacy, and one of their strongest resulting findings was that consumers did not like the current variation 
in how consent is sought by tick boxes, and felt opt-in was much more in the best interests of consumers than opt-out. The 
report attaches a model standardised tick box format.
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words, to retain the status quo. What it should do, however, is clearly distinguish between the 
setting of site-specific cookies (eg when Amazon sets an Amazon cookie), and the setting of 
third party cookies by the likes of DoubleClick93. Since such ad-server cookies are invariably 
set invisibly, and not at the request of the consumer (for who would explicitly request ads?) it 
seems these cannot be covered. Hence it appears European consumers will in future have to be 
persuaded at least not to opt out of receiving cookie-enabled advertisements, at least once - an 
interesting opportunity if consumers are informed enough to grasp it94. In fact however, the 
majority of Internet ads are now served without the use of third party cookies at all, as popular 
browsers, such as later versions of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, are usually now set to block 
third party persistent cookies, using built in P3P95 controls. The most pressing need to regulate 
cookies in the interests of consumer privacy may in fact thus have already come and gone. 
Again, as with the spam problem, the cookie problem seems to have been solved (or at least 
on the way to solution) more effectively and speedily by “code” than by law.
The UK government has indicated in its consultation document and subsequent regulations for 
implementing the Privacy Directive96 an approach which is, in this writer’s opinion, 
disappointingly un-privacy friendly.  On the question of how consumers should be offered the 
right to refuse cookies, the Regulations are entirely silent, except for asserting that the right to 
refuse cookies need not be offered more than once. The Information Commissioner’s guidance 
suggests that the requirement to offer a way of refusing cookies can in fact be met if websites 
merely offer guidance on how consumers might use the facilities of their browser program (eg 
Internet Explorer, Netscape, Safari or Mozilla) to reject cookies97. This seems entirely 
inadequate to provide most consumers with a “user friendly” way to vindicate their legal right 
to refuse. The position is muddied further in the UK regulations where the consumer is using a 
computer while at work; here it seems the person with the right to refuse cookies may well be 
the employer, as well as the employee/consumer -  and whose wishes should prevail in the 
case of conflict is not entirely clear98. On the question of what is “strictly necessary” in 
                                                          
93 See further Edwards and Howels, supra n 89.
94 Of course most consumers ads are served to US web sites from US ad servers and hence at least in practical terms 
outside EC jurisdiction. 
95 P3P is the Platform for Privacy Preferences, a software means to (inter alia) control cookies. See discussion in Edwards 
L “Consumer Privacy, On-Line Business and the Internet: Looking For Privacy in All The Wrong Places” (2003) 3 IJLIT 
226.
96 Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/2426 and Implementation of the 
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications, DTI, March 2003, URN 03/762, at 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/industries/ecommunications/directive_on_privacy_electronic_communications_200258ec.html.
97 Guidance to the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003, Part 2: Secuirity, 
Confidentiality, Traffic and Location Data, Itemised Billing, CLI and Directories, para 2.4.
98 Guidance, para 2.6.
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response to a request by the consumer, the Regulations again say nothing, although the 
guidance notes do specify that “such storage of or access to information should be essential 
as opposed to reasonably necessary” and most importantly, cookies must be set “... for the 
provision of the service requested by the user, rather than what might be essential for any 
other uses the service provider might wish to make of that data.”[italic added]99. This looks a 
lot like the cry of “essential!” cannot be co-opted for cookies which are there merely to enable 
third party advertising (or even advertising directly provided by the website owner?) ,  as that 
is not usually the service the user was requesting.
What next?
Locational and traffic data
Spam and cookies are no longer the only privacy invading technologies (PITs) in the e-
commerce market. The most novel parts of the PECD relate to control of locational and traffic 
data, where their use by service providers might have negative impacts on consumer privacy. 
Locational data broadly refers to information that reveals the whereabouts of the user of a 
mobile phone or similar telecommunications device whose location can be traced and shared. 
It can also includes information as to when a particular user was using a mobile phone at a 
particular location. Traffic data is data processed by the provider of an electronic 
communications network (such as a telecommunications or cable company or ISP) which 
relates to routing, duration or time of a communication.100 While traffic data has long been 
collected by telcos and ISPs for the purposes of billing, capacity management, and other 
internal procedures, locational data is a relatively new concept. It is hoped that exploitation of 
locational data to provide “value added” services to mobile consumers will usher in a new 
profitable wave of mobile e-commerce (“m-commerce”).  Locational data can be shared with 
or sold by the company originally collecting the data, to third parties who wish to provide 
services to users such as, eg, taxis, or fast food, or flowers. Typically,   the third party service 
providers would use the locational data to provide the user with either information or the 
actual goods or services from the physically nearest relevant outlet. Locational data might also 
conceivably be used to serve relevant ads to mobile consumers direct to their phone, or even 
                                                          
99 Guidance, para 2.5.
100 Full definitions of both terms for UK purposes can be found at reg 2 of the UK PECD Regulations. Interestingly the UK 
definition of “locational data” is wider than that stipulated by the PECD itself.
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hypothetically to direct tailored ads at computer-equipped billboards the consumer is passing 
by – the “intelligent billboard” concept.
In principle both traffic data and locational data have their quite proper, and potentially 
profitable, reasons to be collected. But they can also be privacy-threatening technologies. It 
hardly needs to be elaborated how useful it might be to a government, or an individual stalker, 
or a criminal, or a commercial competitor, to know exactly where a mobile phone user is; or 
who exactly a telephone subscriber has rung in the last month; or what websites they visited 
via their ISP and what individual pages they visited and what search terms they entered into a 
search engine. All this information can fall under locational and traffic data. When such data 
is stored and archived for long periods, rather than as is currently industry practice, deleted 
relatively fast when its billing or commercial purposes are done with, the potential privacy 
violation implications become even more severe. Yet in the post 9/11 world, enormous 
pressure is being put on telcos and ISPs, both by law and by extralegal means,  to store and 
retain exactly such data for periods well beyond existing commercial good practice, in the 
interests of future hypothetical criminal or national security investigations. The balance 
between security and privacy is finely drawn in this area, and thus the regulation of traffic and 
locational data in particular is increasingly controversial. The data retention regime of the UK 
for security and law enforcement purposes is currently prescribed principally in the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and its subsidiary regulations, and is beyond the 
scope of this chapter; but it is worth noting that if the PECD restrictions on use of traffic and 
locational data noted below come into conflict with national security and law enforcement 
powers, then it is clearly the latter which win101.
The PECD and the UK implementing Regulations do explicitly attempt for the first time to 
place limits beyond those of general DP law on how traffic and locational data can be 
processed. Art 9 of the PECD provides that locational data can only be processed, which 
includes use, sale and sharing, with the consent of the user or subscriber, and only where it is 
necessary to provide “value added” services. The key exception to this is if the data is 
anonymised. Furthermore, the service provider collecting and processing the locational data 
must inform the user or subscriber prior to obtaining consent of what the locational data may 
be used for – eg, what third party it might be given to provide “value added” services, and for 
how long. Users must also have the option to “opt out” of releasing locational data at any 
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particular point, even if they have given this prior consent. The consent required thus 
resembles the positive opt-in required for spam more than the consent required to receive 
cookies, and thus reflects serious concerns about how locational data might be used.
Traffic data processing is also restricted.  Traffic data, according to reg 8 of the UK PECD 
Regulations, can only be collected for limited purposes defined as: 
 management of traffic or billing; 
 customer enquiries; 
 prevention of detection of fraud; 
 the marketing of electronic communications services102; or
 the provision of a value added service.
As discussed, a “value added service” is an extra service provided to a user/subscriber by use 
of locational or traffic data – possibly by a third party other than the telco or ISP. It is 
technically defined as any service which requires the processing of traffic data or locational 
data beyond that which is necessary for the transmission of a communication or the billing in 
respect of that communication103.
Even when traffic data falls within one of these permissible categories, further restrictions 
apply104. If it is to be processed for the purpose of marketing electronic communications 
services, or to provide value-added services, the user or subscriber to whom the data relates 
must give their consent. This consent may be withdrawn at any time. Even then, the data must 
be processed and stored only for the duration necessary for the relevant purpose. Aside from 
these particular exceptions, the general principle is re-stated from general DP law that when 
traffic data has fulfilled its function – it aided the transmission of a communication – it should 
be either deleted or anonymised105.
The future?
The outstanding question remaining is, is the PECD really “technology neutral”? Does it 
update the DPD with sufficient generality to protect consumer privacy against all foreseeable 
                                                          
102 As defined by s 32 of the Communications Act 2003.
103 UK Regulations, reg 2(1).
104 Ibid, reg 7 (2)(3)(4).
105 Ibid, reg 7(1).
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threats arising from new technologies? Sadly, the answer already seems to be no. One type of 
technology currently under much scrutiny from privacy activists worldwide is the RFID chip. 
RFID chips are tiny microchips attached to an antenna that receives and transmits location 
information by means of radio waves. RFID chips are small, very cheap (costing around 6p 
each), come in many varieties, and are currently used for a multiplicity of commercial 
purposes106. Most commonly, they are used for product tracking and inventory control, access 
control to sealed areas (“smart doors”), contact-less smart cards (eg the Oyster card used by 
London Transport commuters) and animal tagging. More novel applications include using it 
as a hands-free payment mechanism107 and people-tagging108. Most consumer concern around 
RFID has centred on their use in high street stores, basically as a more advanced form of bar-
code.  If RFID tags, which are very small, are attached to, say, shirts, and not removed or de-
activated at point of sale, whether deliberately or by accident,  then the fear of privacy 
advocates and consumer groups is that they will operate as a sort of micro-bug, revealing the 
whereabouts of the buyer to unknown parties for an indefinite time  after sale. In fact, RFID 
chips themselves usually carry no information except the inventory code and description for 
the particular item to which they were attached, and thus in themselves, do not identify the 
buyer, nor disclose personal data describing the buyer. However the identity of the buyer 
could conceivably be discovered if the RFID data was associated at point of sale with the
personal identifying details of the buyer derived who bought the item using a means such as 
credit card, smart card or store card. Although this kind of scenario has caused a great deal of 
angst both in the US109 and Europe110, the privacy concerns are actually rather limited. RFID 
chips are usually passive : that is, they do not broadcast their location as such, but  need to be 
detected by readers at very short range, usually no more than six or seven metres away  (many 
need even closer range111.) RFID readers cost £250 - £3000 each and therefore it is 
                                                          
106 See useful overview of RFID chip technology available at http://www.philips.com; also Brown A “RFID: An Unlawful 
or Just Unwanted Invasion of Privacy?” (2003-2004) Computers and Law December/January 27.
107 See Morton S “Barcelona Clubbers Get Chipped”, 29 September 2004,  at 
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110 See “Consumer Concern Over RFID Cards” , at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4247275.stm, 9 February 2005, 
which claims that 50% of UK consumers polled were very concerned about the use of RFID in shops.
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impractically expensive for RFID tags to be used as “bugs” except within a relatively small 
and circumscribed area like a school, supermarket, library or campus.
The question of how far RFID chips are truly a significant threat to consumer privacy is not 
however the point here. What is germane is that it is not at all certain if RFID technology is 
controlled by data protection law, even as updated by the PECD, and if it is, how it is so 
controlled112. As noted, RFID chips themselves do not contain “personal data”, ie information 
identifying a living person. An RFID chip attached to a Gillette razor blade typically reveals 
nothing other than “I am pack 23340000 [say] of this type of razor blades”, sometimes with 
additional shelving, inventory, expiry date or supply chain history information. As such, prima 
facie RFID chips do not fall within the UK DP regime as it applies only to data which “relates 
to a living individual who can be identified” (DPA 1998, s 1). However as noted above in 
relation to spamming, conceivably RFID processing does fall within the data processing 
regime if the RFID chip data taken with credit card details (say), do, in the point-of-sale 
scenario described above, combine to identify a living individual. (The second part of the 
definition of “personal data” in s 1 of the 1998 Act, it should be recalled, includes the case 
where a living individual can be identified from the data in question and any other information 
which is “likely to come into the possession of the data controller”.) If this were to be the case, 
the DPA 1998 duties of fairness in data processing, as laid down in the Eight Data Protection 
Principles113, might apply to some but not all data processors operating RFID chip systems in 
shops. So, for example, if  Tesco’s, the supermarket chain, attach RFID chips to the packets of 
razor blades they sell in order to monitor and prevent shoplifting, and legitimate buyers of 
razor blades pay by electronic means, then conceivably Tesco’s will be able to tie the 
individual buyer to that packet of razor blades as it leaves the shop, and thus will be 
processing personal data during and after the purchase114. In that case, they might fall under 
duties including the need to give adequate notice of processing to consumers so as to obtain 
implied consent; they would have to notify the purposes for which they were collecting the 
data; and the security implications might have to be considered115. But if payment is made 
                                                          
112 There is a small but growing legal literature on RFID. See Brown supra n 106; Ustaran E “Data Protection and RFID 
Systems” (2003) Privacy and Data Protection 3.6(6); the Ontario Privacy Commisioner has published legal guidelines on 
using RFID tags in libraries at http://www.ipc.on.ca/docs/rfid-lib.pdf . In Europe, the EU Art 29 Working Party has 
published as Working Document on RFID, 10107/05/EN WP 105, January 19 2005, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2005/wp105_en.pdf .
113 Data Protection Act 1998, Schedule 1, Part II.
114 See BBC website,  “Big Brother at the supermarket till?”, 27 January 2005 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4211591.stm .
115 Fuller consideration of how the DP Principles might apply to processors using RFID chips can be found in Art 29 
Working Party Document on RFID, supra n 112.
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with cash, and Tesco’s remove the tags at point-of-sale (as Marks and Spencers did, in their 
RFID test trials with clothing, to the approval of privacy activists) do any DP implications 
arise? Perhaps not. The area is grey in the extreme. 
A further complicating factor is whether RFID tags fall under the new “locational data” 
regime in the PECD described above. Locational data is technically defined solely as “ any 
data processed in an electronic communications network indicating the geographic location of 
the terminal equipment of the user of a public electronic communications service”. As Brown 
notes, it is hard to say that an RFID tag – or even the goods to which it is attached or 
embedded – are “terminal equipment of the user”116. Undefined in the UK PECD Regulations, 
the obvious natural language interpretation would be that it refers to a mobile phone handset, 
a handheld PC, a laptop, or the like. The PECD also fails to define “terminal equipment” and 
interestingly, recital 35 of the PECD seems to imply that all locational data is also traffic data , 
ie data used to facilitate electronic communications– which makes it look even less like the 
kind of data stored in RFID chips or collected using them. RFID chips fundamentally track 
objects (including people); traffic data tracks electronic communications or messages. Yet if 
RFID chips are to fall within the DP regime, it would seem only sensible that they also fall 
within the locational data regime. What RFID does, then, is show that the supposedly 
“technology neutral” regulation of the EC’s latest Privacy Directive falls down badly as soon 
as applied to even the first major commercial privacy-invasive technology to be developed 
since cookies. 
To add insult to injury, the scenario explored so far, of RFID in supermarkets, is one where it 
is relatively easy to minimise privacy violations by simple means such as removal of the tags 
before the purchaser leaves the store. What of the more novel applications of RFID mentioned 
above, such as tagging of children, and of hospital patients, and even the already common use 
of contact-less RFID-chipped smart cards in business HQs and on public transport?117 In these 
scenarios, the RFID chip persists and stays active and associated with the card-holder, and the 
privacy risks seem much higher. 
                                                          
116 Ustaran (supra n 112) however seems to take the view that RFID tags do constitute “locational data”. Interestingly 
though, the Art 29 Working party document, also supra n 112, does not take a view on whether RFID tags collect or 
constitute locational data, though the document  does assert that in many concrete cases, data processed via RFID tags will
constitute “personal data”. 
117 Out-Law.com reports at 14/10/2004 that the US Food and Drugs association has approved the implant sub-dermally of 
RFID chips into patients so that they can be used to access what drugs the particular patient needs, with less chance of 
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In conclusion then, the terrain we have surveyed above, of the legal regulation of privacy-
invasive technologies such as spam, cookies, traffic data and RFID, is not an inspiring one for 
lawyers and legislators. Law faces many problems in this area; the problems of jurisdiction, of 
enforcement, of trans-nationality, of making the public aware of and comprehending of their 
rights; of financing and training of enforcement authorities, and of interpretation when new 
technologies or new tweaks on old technologies come along. Overwhelmingly, the conclusion 
cannot be resisted that law will always be running behind technology in this area and that 
solutions may perhaps best be found not in new legislation, but in international and business 
investment in technical standards and development. Spam has not been arrested in the 
slightest by international legal developments but may be decimated in a few years if changes 
are made to the basic Internet and email technical standards. Cookies were argued over 
sempeternally in the European Parliament, but now as of early 2005 are almost a forgotten 
problem for technologists, and third party advert serving is almost a thing of the past. RFID is 
the new privacy problem on the block and already has muddied the new legislation which 
might have been hoped to control it in advance. Real control of privacy invasion by RFID is 
more likely to come from good practice in the commercial sector or a supervening technology 
which (say) blocks or de-activates RFID chips, than DP law reform. As Lessig might have 
said, it is easier to fight code with code, than code with law. Indeed, code usually trumps law.  
It will be interesting to see if in five years time the legal framework for the protection of 
consumer and citizen privacy in Europe from technological threat has begun to recognize this 
hard truth. We need more, cheaper and easier to use privacy-enhancing technologies and less 
new law: discuss.
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
human error. They could also recognise and record data about allergies.
